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Junk Evidence: A Call to Scrutinize Historical Cell Site 
Location Evidence  
19 U.N.H. L. Rev. 133 (2020) 
A B S T R A C T .   Historical cell site location information (CSLI) has been offered as objective, 
scientific location evidence in criminal trials, but is far less precise than the claims it is used to 
support.  Not only is there no way to pinpoint a cellphone’s precise geographic location from 
historical CSLI, but there are also no known validation or error rates for the methodologies used 
to collect and analyze this data.  A 2019 telecommunications scandal in Denmark revealed gross 
inadequacies in the cellphone data and software used by law enforcement to analyze this type of 
evidence.  The scandal sent shockwaves through the country’s legal community and led to a 
temporary moratorium on the use of cellphone location evidence, a comprehensive investigation 
into data collection and analysis practices, and the adoption of extensive reform and 
improvement measures.  Perhaps even more importantly, the scandal undercut the trust and 
acceptance previously afforded to this type of evidence.  Taking from the lessons learned in 
Denmark, this Note attempts to lay out what is known and unknown about historical CSLI and 
how the current state of this type of evidence comports with the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In 
Part I, this Note first examines how and why historical CSLI is produced.  Part II summarizes the 
current known issues with this type of cellphone location evidence.  Finally, Part III sets forth the 
evidentiary shortcomings of historical CSLI that may be raised in criminal trials.  
A U T H O R .   University of New Hampshire School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2021.  Sincerest thanks 
to Professor Buzz Scherr for his “annoying and supportive” guidance throughout the writing 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON  
In June 2019, authorities in Denmark discovered errors in the way cellphone 
location data had been used in criminal trials in the country beginning in 2012.1  
Among the errors found, officials  discovered that a flaw in the software used by 
police to analyze cellphone evidence omitted key location data collected by phone 
companies and linked phones to incorrect cellphone towers. 2   This meant that 
cellphones were sometimes linked to towers located hundreds of miles away from 
where the phone was at the time of the call.3  Denmark’s “telecommunications data 
scandal” shook the country’s trust in its legal system and led to the review of over 
10,000 court verdicts, the release of 32 prisoners, and a two-month ban on the use 
of cellphone location data in criminal trials.4  When announcing this response to 
the discovered errors, Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions explained, “[w]e 
simply cannot live with the idea that information that isn’t accurate could send 
people to prison.”5 
Denmark’s telecommunications scandal prompted an external investigation 
into its use of cellphone location data.6  This led the national police to adopt an 
entirely new infrastructure for handling cellphone data and implement routine 
independent quality control and data validation.7   It also prompted Norway to 
investigate its own use of cellphone location data.8 
 
1  IT-Pol, Danish Data Retention: Back to Normal After Major Crisis, European Digital Rights 
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://edri.org/danish-data-retention-back-to-normal-after-major-crisis/ [https:
//perma.cc/BD4Z-KNXT].  
2  Louise Dalsgaard & Emma Toft, Understand the Mistakes in the Telecommunications Scandal: 
Telephone Was in Copenhagen and Frederikshavn at the Same Time, Danish Broad. Corp. (Aug. 31, 
2019, 8:45 AM),  https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/forstaa-fejlene-i-teleskandalen-telefon-var-
i-koebenhavn-og-frederikshavn-paa-samme, [https://perma.cc/CR7H-5HJD]. 
3  Id. 
4  Jon Henley, Denmark Frees 32 Inmates Over Flaws in Phone Geolocation Evidence, Guardian 
(Sep. 12, 2019 6:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/12/denmark-frees-32-
inmates-over-flawed-geolocation-revelations [https://perma.cc/TKP3-YRH9]; Martin Selsoe 
Sorensen, Flaws in Cellphone Evidence Prompt Evidence of 10,000 Verdicts in Denmark, N.Y. Times 
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/world/europe/denmark-cellphone-data-
courts.html [https://perma.cc/AGE6-3Z2F]. 
5  Henley, supra note 4.  
6  IT-Pol, supra note 1. 
7  Id. 
8  Associated Press, Norway to Review Criminal Cases with Danish Telecom Data, Fed. News 
Network (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:37 AM) https://federalnewsnetwork.com/world-news/2019/
08/norway-to-probe-criminal-cases-with-danish-telecom-data/ [https://perma.cc/T2SR-U2GA]. 
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The Denmark scandal underscores what critics have been saying about 
cellphone location evidence for years: using cellphone records to prove a criminal 
defendant’s physical location is junk science.9  Yet, cellphone location evidence is 
used in tens of thousands of criminal cases in the United States each year.10  In 
Denmark, the country’s mindset about cellphone data has changed.11  This scandal 
– along with our understanding of the imprecision of cellphone location data, the 
unknown reliability of the methods used to collect and analyze this data, and the 
risk that juries will overvalue the accuracy of this evidence – should not be ignored.  
No country should be comfortable with the idea that inaccurate evidence could send 
people to prison.  
I .  UNDE R S T ANDI NG HI S T OR I C AL  C S L I  & I T S  L I MI T AT I ONS  
Nearly 96% of Americans owned a cellphone in 2019.12  The vast majority of 
cellphone owners frequently carry their phones with them, and most never or rarely 
turn their phones off.13   Each day, the average cellphone user both makes and 
receives six phone calls and 32 text messages.14  Even the Supreme Court has had 
 
9  See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Prosecutors’ use of mobile phone tracking is ‘junk science,’ critics say, ABA J. 
(June 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/prosecutors_use_of
_mobile_phone_tracking_is_junk_science_critics_say [https://perma.cc/RPY2-EVEY]; Jeff Chinn, 
Mobile Phone Tracking = Junk Science? California Innocence Project, Jun. 4, 2013, 
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/2013/06/mobile-phone-tracking-junk-science/ 
[https://perma.cc/TL96-P7TA]. 
10  Albert Fox Cahn, Phone Tracking Data is Notoriously Unreliable. So Why Are We Still Using it in 
Court?, Daily Beast (Sep. 16, 2019 5:24 AM) https://www.thedailybeast.com/denmarks-
geolocation-data-crisis-could-prompt-a-reckoning-in-the-us-criminal-justice-system 
[https://perma.cc/3GS7-TURQ]. 
11  Henley, supra note 4 (quoting Karoline Normann, Head of the Danish Law Society’s Criminal 
Law Committee) (“This situation has changed our mindset about cellphone data.  We are probably 
going to question it as we normally question a witness or other types of evidence, where we 
consider who produced the evidence, and why and how.”) 
12  Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet
/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/8T84-KQEX]. 
13  Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Chapter 1: Always on Connectivity, Americans’ Views on Mobile 
Etiquette, Pew Res. Ctr. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/
chapter-1-always-on-connectivity/ [https://perma.cc/A2JL-JRNA]. 
14  No Time to Talk: Americans Sending/Receiving Five Times as Many Texts Compared to Phone Calls 
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occasion to note that “modern cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent 
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”15 
The prevalence of cellphone use and advancements in phone technology have 
made cellphones a growing source of evidence in criminal cases.16  Evidence from 
cellphones can take many forms – including information like text messages, photos, 
and e-mail, as well as billing records of phone activity and use. 17   Frequently, 
cellphones are used to provide crucial evidence in criminal cases to place a 
defendant at the time and place of a crime.18  
The three most common ways cellphones are used to determine location are 
through Global Positioning System (GPS) technology; triangulation, a process used 
to estimate the location of a phone based on the cell tower locations of where its 
signal registers; and analyzing historical cell site location information or CSLI from 
a cellphone user’s call records.19   Though GPS and triangulation are considered 
quite accurate in determining a cellphone’s location, both methods typically require 
collecting information in real time.20  Given the practical reality that most crimes 
are investigated after the fact, law enforcement frequently relies on historical CSLI, 
“the least accurate method of tracking a cell phone,” to hypothesize a defendant’s 
location when the alleged crime occurred.21  This Note considers CSLI – the use and 
analysis of cellphone call detail records and historical cell site location information 
– evidence which “is fraught with potential misunderstandings by courts and juries 
alike.”22 
 
15  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (holding that a search warrant is required to search 
a cellphone even when phones are seized incident to arrest).  
16  Larry E. Daniel & Lars E. Daniel, Digital Forensics for Legal Professionals: 
Understanding Digital Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom 263 (Robert 
Maxwell & Sue Spielman eds., 2012). 
17  Id. at 19. 
18  John B. Minor, Forensic Cell Site Analysis: A Validation & Error Mitigation Methodology, 12 J. DIGIT. 
Forensics, Security & L. 33, 34 (2017). 
19  Thomas J. Kirkham, Comment, Rejecting Historical Cell Site Location Information as Unreliable 
Under Daubert and Rule 702, 50 U. Tol. L. Rev. 361, 372 (2019); Rajiv Netra, How GPS, Cell Tower and 
Wi-Fi Triangulation Help in Tracking Location?, Safetrax (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.safetrax.in/
2017/09/05/gps-cell-tower-triangulation-help-tracking-location/ [https://perma.cc/HUA8-WN7
X]. 
20  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 373.  The privacy and Fourth Amendment implications of real-time 
GPS and triangulation tracking are not addressed in this Note.  
21  Id. at 361–62. 
22  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 225.  
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A. How Cellphones Operate in Cellular Networks  
Cellphones work by sending and receiving radio signals between the phone’s 
internal antennas and cell towers. 23   Cell towers are one part of the system of 
equipment and technology that facilitates cellular networks.24   This system also 
includes transceiver stations, located at the base of every cell tower, which connect 
the radio signals from cellphones to radio network controllers, and mobile 
switching centers, which connect to all of the cell towers in a coverage area.25  Every 
communication from a cellphone is routed through a mobile switching center and 
then onto the other phone with which it is communicating.26 
When a cellphone is first turned on, it attempts to “register” with a cellular 
network by sending a radio signal to the cell tower with the strongest signal.27  There 
are hundreds of thousands of cell towers (also known as cell sites) in the United 
States – ranging from the tall, metal radio tower masts to antennas on raised 
structures like rooftops and billboards.28  Given the large number of cell tower sites, 
a cellphone is usually no more than a few miles from a tower that it can connect to.29  
However, depending on the capabilities of the phone, internal cellphone antennas 
have the capacity to send radio signals to towers several miles away, potentially up 
to over 20 miles.30  
Cell towers typically provide coverage to circular areas with a few-miles’ radius, 
 
23  Id. at 229–30. 
24  Id. at 226. 
25  Id. at 228. 
26  Mobile Switching Center (MSC), Techopedia (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/8448/mobile-switching-center-msc [https://perma.cc/443V-UEZA]; Cellular Network, 
Techopedia (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24962/cellular-network 
[https://perma.cc/JZ35-9S8E]. 
27  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 229. 
28  Linda Hardesty, China Tower Counts 1.95M Tower Sites, Dwarfing US Tower Sites, Fierce 
Wireless (Oct. 4, 2019 2:42 PM), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/china-tower-counts-1-
95m-tower-sites-dwarfing-us-tower-sites [https://perma.cc/R7HY-8H32]; Cell Tower Industry Facts 
& Figures 2016, Vertical Consultants, https://www.celltowerleaseexperts.com/cell-tower-lease-
news/cell-tower-industry-facts-figures-2016/ [https://perma.cc/L4AG-M8SN] (last visited Mar. 6, 
2020).  
29  Bert Markgraf, How Far Can a Cell Tower Be for a Cellphone to Pick Up the Signal? Chron.: Small 
Bus., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/far-can-cell-tower-cellphone-pick-up-signal-32124.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZR8C-JQ7P] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).  
30  Id. 
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but the coverage area can vary in both distance and radius.31  For example, small 
towers in office buildings or airports may only have a coverage radius of 250 yards, 
while large cell tower structures can cover a range of ten miles or more in rural 
settings.32  And although some towers are designed to provide coverage to circular 
areas, others are designed to provide coverage in linear areas such as along a stretch 
of highway.33  The breadth of coverage areas leads to overlapping zones, meaning in 
a given location, a cellphone is usually within the coverage reach of multiple cell 
towers.34  
It is a common misconception that a cellphone connects to the cell tower 
physically closest to it when registering to a cellular network.35  On the contrary, 
the cellphone connects to the cell tower emitting the strongest signal.36  Many 
factors affect the signal strength between a cellphone and the cell tower it 
connects to, including the number of available cell sites, which can be affected by 
repairs and maintenance; the technical characteristics of the tower, antenna, and 
phone; the weather, topography, and population density of the area; and whether 
the phone is being used indoors or outdoors.37  This variability means it is possible 
for two cellphones – subscribed to the same cellular provider and in the exact same 
location – to place calls at the same time and connect to two different cell towers.38  
B. How CSLI is Collected  
When a cellphone sends or receives radio signals from a cell tower, the 
 
31  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 226, 233; Mark F. Rewers, How to Find Your Nearest Cell Tower 
Locations, Uber Signal (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.ubersignal.com/blog/cell-tower-locations/ 
[https://perma.cc/HKZ4-4F6P]. 
32  Michael Harris, How Cell Towers Work, Unison (2011), http://www.unisonsite.com/
pdf/resource-center/How%20Towers%20Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q45C-EYZ4]. 
33  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 369.  
34  Id. 
35  Douglas Starr, What Your Cell Phone Can’t Tell the Police, New Yorker (June 26, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-your-cell-phone-cant-tell-the-police 
[https://perma.cc/UM9E-SA37].   
36  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 229–30. 
37  Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the 
Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech., Fall 2011, at 1, 7. 
38  Tom Jackman, Experts Say Law Enforcement’s Use of Cellphone Records Can be Inaccurate, Wash. 
Post (June 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say-law-enforcements-use-
of-cellphone-records-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_
story.html [https://perma.cc/JB79-AA8M]. 
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registration “ping” is processed through databases of account user information in 
mobile switching centers.39   As a cellphone signal connects to a cell tower, the 
cellular network learns the tower location of the phone and then determines 
whether the phone has an active account that can receive and make calls.40  While it 
is turned on, a cellphone will continue to periodically ping the tower with the 
strongest signal so that it remains registered to the system and can be located for 
incoming calls.41  This allows a cellphone to maintain registration to a network or 
connection for a call while a person is moving or driving, or while other factors 
affecting signal – like weather or cell traffic – fluctuate.42  
Cellular network equipment collects user and network information from these 
registration pings, including the account, date, time, and tower location receiving 
the signal.43  However, because cellphone users are not billed for merely connecting 
to a network, cellphone carriers have no use to store the information from these 
registration pings beyond a few hours.44   When a cellphone is used to place or 
receive a call or text message, cellular providers record the information collected by 
network equipment for customer billing and network monitoring purposes.45  This 
“historical” metadata of cell activity, such as phone calls and text messages that pass 
through mobile switching centers, are retained by cellular companies for at least 18 
months, as opposed to the mere hours the registration pings are stored.46  
When requested, cellular companies can generate billing records and CDRs 
with various data collected by the company. 47  The contents of CDRs can vary based 
on the carrier and the information requested, but typically show “details of the call 
such as the origination and destination addresses of the call, the time the call started 
and ended, the duration of the call … [and] other billings associated with the call.”48  
CDRs also indicate the identification number of the cell tower that the phone 
 
39  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 230. 
40  Id. 
41  Id.  
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id.; Kirkham, supra note 19, at 372. 
45  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 225, 232.  
46  Id. at 163; see also 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2020).  
47  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–65, 232. 
48  Monique C.M. Leahy, Telecommunications and Other Litigation: Call Detail Records and Fraud, in 
97 Am. Jur. Trials 1 § 1 (2020). 
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connected to during the registered activity.49  The information about tower location 
contained in CDRs is generally referred to as cell site location information or CSLI.50  
CDRs are different from the actual billing statement that a carrier sends to its 
customers, which translates the metadata of codes and strings of numbers from 
CDRs into readable information about phone activity related to charges based on 
the customer’s service plan. 51   When a CDR is requested by an individual or 
agency52, cellular providers produce a record showing the requested data fields and 
information about how to decipher the included data.53  To illustrate: 





This CDR indicates the date of the call (20040229), the time of the call (2348347, i.e., 
11:48:34.7 pm), the calling number (7875558911), the called number (78755577180), the 
carrier identifier (0155), the billable time of the call (00000868, i.e., 868 tenths of seconds 
or one minute and 26.8 seconds), and other numbers including the switch name and 
trunk group.54 
Though the tower location recorded on the CDR merely indicates that the 
phone was somewhere within the signal coverage radius of the tower during the 
recorded activity, many claims are made as to what police and prosecutors can glean 
from the data embedded in CDRs. 55  Indeed, “[a]s early as 1999, cellular carriers 
began to produce Call Detail Records (CDR)/Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) 
evidence in response to subpoena, search warrants, and court orders.”56  However, 
the claims made based on the information in CDRs are frequently “overstated”:  
One of the most important things to remember is that a cell phone cannot be located 
from a historical call detail record.  The best that can be done is that the phone can be 
placed in a general area corresponding to a cell tower that was connected to the phone 
 
49  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 232–33.  
50  Minor, supra note 18, at 33.  
51  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231; Leahy, supra note 48.  
52  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) controls disclosure of call detail records 
and requires a court order, search warrant, or the subscriber’s consent to release. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
(2019). 
53  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 164–64 
54  Leahy, supra note 48.  
55  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231–32. 
56  Minor, supra note 18, at 33.  
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at a particular time when a call was made or attempted.57 
Moreover, CDRs do not record the other cell towers that the phone was within range 
of or how far the cellphone was from the tower associated with the call to allow for 
a more precise triangulation of the phone’s location.58  And notably, CDRs cannot 
record who used the cellphone to make the registered activity. 59   Though this 
information would certainly be helpful evidence in criminal cases, CDRs are merely 
records used by cellphone companies “for the purpose of financial transactions such 
as generating bills to the subscriber and … settling accounts with other carriers.”60  
This is because “the cellular system was not designed to locate cellular phones 
beyond simply knowing if a cellphone can be reached to connect a call.”61  
Not only do CDRs contain limited information, but the accuracy of the 
information they contain is relatively unknown.62  Neither cellular carriers nor the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which maintains cell site licensing 
filings, has documented error rates or validation methodologies for CDR or CSLI 
records.63  Thus, it is generally unclear how accurate the actual location information 
in these records is before it is then subjected to external analysis.64      
C. How CSLI is Analyzed 
Historical cell site analysis is the process of using cellular network information 
to analyze and interpret the recorded cell site location information in CDRs to 
approximate a cellphone user’s past location. 65   Historical CSLI cannot be 
interpreted from CDRs alone.66  The analysis involves interpreting the data from 
CDRs, like the identification numbers of the cell tower locations used by a phone 
number at specific times, against additional information from cellphone providers 
corresponding to the cell tower identification numbers, like coverage maps, 
configurations, and maintenance records for cell towers.67 
 
57  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231–32. 
58  Blank, supra note 37, at 13.  
59  Id. at 18. 
60  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163.  
61  Id. at 225.  
62  Minor, supra note 18, at 35.   
63  Id.  
64  Id. at 34–35.  
65  Minor, supra note 18, at 33.  
66  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–64. 
67  Id.  
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1. CSLI Mapping and Software  
The primary method of analyzing historical CSLI involves creating maps of cell 
site locations showing estimated cell site coverage areas where registered cellular 
activity could have occurred.68   Essentially, analysts compare the times and cell 
tower locations recorded in CDRs with records from the cellphone company about 
cell tower locations, coverage, and maintenance history.69  The analyst then maps 
out the coverage area of the identified cell towers and uses what she knows about 
the tower’s configuration and signal to estimate where the registered cellphone 
activity could have occurred. 70   Given the amount of interpretation involved, 
mapping has “varying levels of accuracy” and “often provid[es] an unreliable 
interpretation of the actual evidence.”71  
The easiest and most common way CSLI is analyzed is by inputting the data 
from CDRs and carrier records into mapping software that generate maps of cell 
tower locations and approximate where a cellphone could have connected to a cell 
tower during a given call. 72   The availability of mapping software can expedite 
analysis of CDR and CSLI data. 73   Law enforcement, for example, often use 
commercial software to analyze historical CSLI.74   One such software company 
advertises that it can map up to 4,000 calls in the time it would take to map one call 
by hand.75  These programs are also used to generate visual aids and maps at trial.76  
But the ability to press an “easy button” and automatically map CSLI means that 
individuals conducting historical cell site analysis may only know how to use the 
software and may not know how to properly analyze CDRs, interpret carrier 
records, or understand the limitations of CSLI the way they would if conducting this 
 
68  Minor, supra note 18, at 33–34.  
69  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 164. 
70  Id. 
71  Minor, supra note 18, at 33–34. 
72  Larry Daniel, et al., Are There Really Flaws in Cell Phone Location Evidence?, Envista Forensics 
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.envistaforensics.com/blog/are-there-really-flaws-in-cell-phone-
location-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/Y476-6RD3]. See generally Basic Historical Cell Site Analysis 
Course Presented by FBI CAST, Evansville Police (Nov. 2018), http://evansvillepolice.com/sites/
default/files/Basic%20Historical%20Cell%20Site%20Analysis%20Course.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VE5-4CJV]. 
73  Id.  
74  Id.  
75  Benefits, Hawk Analytics, http://www.hawkanalytics.com/benefits/ [https://perma.cc/
H9U2-5MUF] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).  
76  Id.  
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process manually.77 
2. Forensic Radio Surveys/Drive Tests  
Another method used to analyze historical cell site information involves 
conducting a forensic radio survey or “drive test.”78  Drive testing “is a method used 
by wireless telephone companies and radio frequency engineers to determine the 
coverage range of a cell tower for the purpose of determining the health of the 
telephone company’s wireless network.”79  When employed by law enforcement, it 
can test whether “at the time of the drive test and in the location of the drive testing 
equipment, a phone can make an outgoing call and the phone can ‘hear’ a signal 
from a cell tower.”80  
The process begins by analyzing the data from CDRs and network information 
about the corresponding cell site locations to determine the general area where the 
recorded cellular activity could have occurred.81  Then, an analyst drives through the 
area while operating mobile receiver equipment to measure the signal strength of 
all towers in the area. 82   The results from a drive test can be used to validate 
information from a CDR and areas of interest to show “that a cell phone could be at 
a particular place and would prefer the cell site and sector that was recorded in the 
historical call detail records.”83  Alternatively, drive test results can be used to “create 
a map showing the limits of where a cell phone could be and connect to a cell tower 
or sector.” 84   However, given all the factors that affect signal strength and the 
unlikelihood that the weather and cellular network conditions during the test drive 
are identical to those when the cellular activity actually occurred, the reliability of 
this methodology is disputed.85 
 
77  Daniel et al., supra note 72.  
78  United States v. Morgan, 292 F. Supp. 3d 475, 478–79 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Larry Daniel, Cell 
Phone Location Evidence for Legal Professionals: Understanding Cell Phone 
Location Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom (Academic Press 2017, 1st ed. 
2017)).  
79  Id.  
80  Id.  
81  Id.  
82  Id.  
83  Larry Daniel, Cell Phone Location Evidence for Legal Professionals: 
Understanding Cell Phone Location Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom 76 
(Academic Press, 1st ed. 2017). 
84  Id.  
85  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 377; Compare Phillips v. State, 233 Md. App. 184, 189–90 (Md. Ct. 
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I I .  P R OB L E MS  WI T H HI S T OR I C AL  C S L I  E VI DE N C E 
Forensic cell site analysis is used regularly in criminal cases in the United States 
and is viewed as a “primary means of establishing [defendant location] evidence.”86  
Though it is often regarded as scientific and objective proof of such evidence, the 
accuracy of cell site analysis is highly variable and remarkably unvalidated.87  The 
unreliability of this evidence, and consequently the risk of it being overly utilized in 
criminal investigations and trials, has caught the attention of courts, 88  legal 
scholars,89 and media90.    
The criticism of historical cell site location analysis ranges from calls that it is 
“junk science” that should be excluded from any use in criminal trials,91 to calls for 
ensuring proper use that includes disclaimers of its limitations.92  The consensus 
among legal scholars seems to recognize the limitations of historical cellphone 
location evidence and to agree that such evidence cannot be used to pinpoint a 
phone’s precise location.93  However, as long as this evidence is used in criminal 
trials, its limitations and admissibility must be better understood by attorneys, 
courts, and juries.  
A. Unknown Accuracy of Underlying Data  
1. Call Detail Records  
First, historical cell site analysis depends on interpreting data collected by 
cellular companies in CDRs and in documentation of network infrastructure, 
maintenance, and system performance also produced by cellular companies.94  As 
 
Spec. App. 2017) (reviewing lower court’s conclusion that drive tests were not found to be generally 
accepted in the digital forensic science community or subject to peer-review), with United States 
v. Morgan, 292 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding the methodology of drive testing to be 
generally reliable).  
86  Minor, supra note 18, at 34. 
87  Id.  
88  See, e.g., Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Admissibility of Historical Cell Phone Location Evidence, 44 No. 4 
Litig. 53 (Summer 2018). 
89  See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 19; and Blank, supra note 37.  
90  See, e.g., Starr, supra note 35; GlobeNewswire, Does Cell Phone Location Data Make for Bad 
Evidence? Yahoo! Finance (Feb. 9, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-cell-phone-
location-data-013308219.html, [https://perma.cc/E3CD-FBP8].  
91  Hansen, supra note 9. 
92  Daniel et al., supra note 72.  
93  See sources cited supra notes 86–87. 
94  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–64. 
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discussed above 95 , these records are collected by cellular companies for billing, 
coverage, and analytics purposes, but are routinely used for much graver purposes 
against criminal defendants.96  These are clearly incongruent interests in ensuring 
the accuracy of the location information collected.  Additionally, cellular providers 
have never documented error rates or validation methodologies for the following 
records regularly used in historical cell site analysis:  
1. Carrier cell site location database records.  
2. CDR/CSLI records. 
3. Documented network infrastructure and operational failures.97  
So, the first limitation in forensic cell site analysis is evident before the analysis even 
begins: the data that is being analyzed comes from unvalidated records of cellular 
network operations and unvalidated information about cell tower locations 
collected by phone companies for network billing purposes.98  Practically speaking, 
it is uncertain how accurate the data in a CDR is – meaning we do not know whether 
cellular systems accurately record the identification number of the cell tower used 
to place a call 100% of the time or 99% of the time or less.  Currently, law enforcement 
and courts rely on the underlying data contained in CDRs as if it is 100% accurate.99  
This ignores the possibility for errors in equipment glitches when recording cellular 
activity data and in the process of compiling usable data into CDRs.   
The possible inaccuracy of CDR data was highlighted in the widely popular 2014 
podcast “Serial,” which investigated the 1999 murder of Hae Min Lee in Baltimore, 
Maryland, and the ultimate conviction of Lee’s ex-boyfriend Adnan Syed.100  At trial, 
cellphone records showing that Syed’s phone pinged a cell tower near the park 
where the victim’s body was found “played a significant role in the State’s case and 
the jury’s decision-making process.” 101   However, in the wake of the podcast’s 
spotlight on the case, it was discovered that a fax cover sheet accompanying the 
 
95  See infra Part I, B. 
96  Minor, supra note 18, at 33. 
97  Id. at 35. 
98  See generally Minor, supra note 18.  
99  Id. at 35.  
100  Justin Fenton & Tim Prudente, Adnan Syed Case: Maryland High Court Reinstates ‘Serial’ Subject’s 
Conviction, Balt. Sun (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:15 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-
ci-syed-appeal-20190222-story.html [https://perma.cc/35NN-M9W2]. 
101  Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046, 1, 56 (Balt. Cir. Ct. 2016); Jon Swaine, Serial’s Adnan 
Syed: Doubts Over Cellphone Evidence Central to Retrial, Guardian (Jul. 1, 2016, 12:38 EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2016/jul/01/serial-adnan-syed-new-trial-hae-min-
lee-murder [https://perma.cc/G9SA-G8V6].  
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“Subscriber Activity Report”102 used at Syed’s trial contained an explicit disclaimer 
about the reliability of its cell site location data. 103   The instructions stated: 
“Outgoing calls only are reliable for location status. Any incoming calls will NOT be 
reliable for location.”104  Presumably, this meant that the carrier’s report generated 
cell tower information that did not necessarily correspond with incoming calls.  The 
need for the disclaimer could have stemmed from unreliable cellular technology or 
known errors in the carrier’s system at the time the calls were made.105  In either 
event, the disclaimer and the limitation of the location data from the records were 
not introduced by the state or challenged by Syed’s defense attorney.106   Syed’s 
initial petition for postconviction relief was granted based on his trial attorney’s 
failure to cross-examine the state’s witness about the disclaimer and the reliability 
of the relied upon records.107  This decision was ultimately reversed on procedural 
grounds.108   
2. Cellular Network Records 
The second source of underlying data used in historical cell site analysis also 
comes from cellular network providers – “cell site location database records” and 
“[d]ocumented network infrastructure and operational failures.”109  These records 
include the cellular company’s list of cell tower identification numbers and current 
locations, the coverage areas and configurations for each tower, and maintenance 
records for cell towers and other cellular equipment. 110   This supplemental 
information is needed for analysts to interpret the calls and recorded cell tower 
 
102  Though the state attempted to differentiate the term “Subscriber Activity Report” from “call 
detail records” to argue the disclaimer did not apply to the document relied on at trial, the 
cellphone carrier records at issue contained call activity and cell tower location information in the 
way of “call detail records” as discussed by this Note. Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at 
50–51.  
103  Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at 40. 
104  Id.  
105  See Christina Everett, 5 Key Findings from ‘Undisclosed’ that ‘Serial’ Missed, Entertainment 
Weekly (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://ew.com/article/2015/08/24/5-key-finding-undisclosed-
serial-adnan-syed/ [https://perma.cc/64VJ-Q3DA] (hypothesizing “[o]ne of the reasons for this 
disclaimer was due to a glitch with AT&T at the time, which had incoming calls ping the tower 
near the person making the call rather than the person on the receiving end.”).  
106  Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at 40. 
107  Id. at 59.  
108  State v. Syed, 204 A.3d. 139 (MD Ct. App. 2019).  
109  Minor, supra note 18, at 35.  
110  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–64; Minor, supra note 18, at 37. 
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number listed in CDRs. 111   Again, cellular companies produce and retain this 
information for their own network monitoring and planning and have documented 
neither error rates nor validation methodologies for these records.112    
One research project found that verifying the geographic cell site locations from 
the records produced by cellular carriers can “eliminate[] a substantial percentage 
of errors” in cell site analysis.113  In the study, “a cellular carrier produced records in 
response to a search warrant that erroneously identified more than 20 cell site 
locations within a radius of 2 miles.”114  Essentially, the cellular carrier provided 
incorrect information about the locations of its own cell sites due to documentation 
errors in its records of cite installation and equipment upgrades.115  
The possibility of inaccurate cellular network records is not hypothetical: 
incorrect cell tower location data provided by cellular companies was one of the 
issues contributing to Denmark’s telecommunications data scandal.116  Denmark’s 
National Police explained the discovery that: 
[T]he telecom providers’ mast117 lists have not been correct and continuously updated, 
and [] there have therefore been errors in the telecommunications providers’ historical 
lists of the telematers’ locations.  
 
This could be, for example, because a telecommunications company has set up 
temporary masts due to repairs to existing masts, or because there is a festival in an area 
which therefore needs extra masts as there are more people gathered in one place.118 
Inaccurate cellular network records compromise the reliability of historical cell site 
analysis because “[w]hen cell site locations are not validated[,] the preliminary 
analysis mapping risks introduction of false positive indications of the general 
location of the [phone].”119  In Denmark, the discovery of this problem led national 
police to establish a new collaboration with telecommunication companies to 
ensure accuracy in the records they provide police.120  Until such action is taken in 
 
111  Id. 
112  Minor, supra note 18, at 35. 
113  Id. at 37. 
114  Id. 
115  Id.  
116  Dalsgaard & Togt, supra note 2. 
117  The term “mast” refers to cellular network antenna equipment, which this Note refers to 
generally as “cell towers.” See Kirkham, supra note 19, at 370.  
118  Dalsgaard & Togt, supra note 2. 
119  Minor, supra note 18, at 37. 
120  Danish Minister of Justice, Facts About Measures in the Telecom Data Case, Press Release (Oct. 4, 
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the United States, attorneys should be prepared to challenge any cell site analysis 
conducted without this crucial validation step.121 
B. Cellphones Do Not Always Connect to the Closest Cell Tower 
Assuming cellular carrier equipment correctly records the data about a call and 
assuming this data is correctly transcribed in a CDR that is analyzed against 
accurate cellular network records, this only means that a cellphone was able to 
connect to a cellphone tower at a specific moment in time.  Because cellphones do 
not always connect to the cell tower that is physically closest but to the one with the 
strongest signal, this may or may not be probative of the phone’s location.122  The 
potential risks of overvaluing a cell tower’s location relative to the phone’s actual 
location can be illustrated by the dangerous problems resulting from the reliance 
on tower-location in developments to the United State’s 911 routing system.123  
The 911 system relies on the location of the cell towers used to place emergency 
calls to route callers to nearby dispatch centers.124   This is essentially the same 
principle behind historical CSLI mapping, which hypothesizes a cellphone’s 
location based on the tower used to make or receive a call.125  The goal of the 911 
system’s use of cell tower location is to route calls to the closest “public safety 
answering point (PSAP)”so that emergency services can be dispatched to the caller’s 
location as quickly as possible.126  However, because the “location of the cell tower 
that handles the call … may be some distance (varying from a few hundred feet to 
several miles) from the caller’s location,” a high volume of emergency calls are 
routed to the wrong dispatch center (dispatch centers that are closer to the cell 
tower than the caller’s actual location).127   For example, after sustaining a head 
injury, a pregnant woman called 911 from a playground in Burlington County, New 
Jersey, but the cell tower she connected to routed her to a dispatch center in 
 
2019), https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2019/fakta-om-tiltag-
i-teledatasagen [https://perma.cc/J362-WR44]; “Lesson 7” in https://www.justitsministeriet.dk
/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2019/faktaark_-_tiltag.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/C234-NW8V] (translated in Danish).  
121  See Minor, supra note 18, at 37.   
122  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 368.   
123  Id. at 379. 
124  Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls, 33 FCC Rcd. 3238, 1 (Mar. 23, 2018). 
125  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 379.   
126  Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls, supra note 124. 
127  Id. 
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Philadelphia.128  Emergency calls like this are not technically “misrouted,” because 
they are correctly routed to PSAPs closest to the tower location that facilitated the 
call; rather, the errors occur because the system relies on the fallacy that cellphones 
always connect to the nearest cell tower.129  
Tower-based routing results in delays in the delivery of emergency response 
services, leading to greater injuries and sometimes death. 130   The FCC has 
responded to the problem by enacting “Enhanced 911 rules” and new requirements 
for wireless carriers.131  It is believed that the FCC’s transition from “tower-based 
routing to location-based routing” could improve the reliability of 911 dispatch 
routing and save over 10,000 lives per year.132  Critics of the use of historical CSLI 
against criminal defendants have pointed to the 911 system as an example of the 
unreliability of cell towers to determine location.133  The FCC’s recognition of the 
inadequacy of relying on cell towers in determining caller location has given further 
weight to the argument that “[a] methodology that has been determined by 
independent government agencies not to be able to stake a caller’s life on should not 
now be accepted as reliable enough to risk a defendant's liberty.”134 
C. Untested Methods of Analysis 
In addition to not knowing the reliability of the underlying data in CDRs, the 
methodologies used to analyze historical CSLI have only been tested by law 
enforcement.135  This means that there are no known error rates to support the 
accuracy of CSLI mapping, software used to analyze historical CSLI, or drive tests.  
These methods of interpreting historical CSLI have only been implemented by law 
enforcement, the same party who is usually offering the evidence against a criminal 
defendant.136  And just as CSLI and CDR data have been “acknowledged as accurate 
 
128  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 381. 
129  Id.  
130  Id. 
131  Enhanced 911 – Wireless Services, Federal Communications Commission, https://
www.fcc.gov/general/enhanced-9-1-1-wireless-services (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/GFA3-8U3T].  
132  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 382. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. (citing Michael Cherry, et al., Cell Tower Junk Science, 95 JUDICATURE 151, 152 (2012)).  
135  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 377.  
136  Id.  (“No one outside of law enforcement is testing these methods because no one outside of 
law enforcement uses these methods to track a phone.”).   
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by [] courts without any validation or error mitigation,”137 courts have generally 
accepted the methods used to analyze this data merely because they are widely used 
by law enforcement.138 
A recent study in the U.S. exploring ways to improve accuracy in forensic cell 
site analysis recommended both validating the underlying CSLI and CDR data and 
set forth a multi-step methodology for analyzing this data.139   The methodology 
combines many of the processes that are often independently relied on by law 
enforcement, and it also advises taking additional steps to promote accuracy and 
mitigate the errors that can result from inaccurate cellular network records and the 
impact of external factors that affect cell signal.140   The proposed methodology 
recommends conducting drive tests, performing a topographic analysis, 
researching aggravating events that contribute to cell signal traffic, analyzing 
network infrastructure and traffic, researching historical weather conditions, 
analyzing network operations and maintenance records, analyzing cell carrier 
performance metrics, and researching cellular operating standards.141  The study 
found that these steps “resulted in a modified final mapping analysis in 
approximately 40% of the cases,” and even more significantly, that it “resulted in a 
modified final mapping analysis that impacted the outcome of the case in terms of 
the verdict of guilt or innocence in criminal cases or damages award in civil 
litigation” in 6% of cases.142  
The study also noted that “[a]lthough several specialty software tools purport to 
produce accurate analysis results, including mapping generated from CDR/CSLI 
evidence, none of the software tools currently perform the discovered evidence 
validation and analysis error mitigation methodology.”143  With no other studies 
confirming the reliability of traditional CSLI analysis, this study suggests that as 
many as 40% of mapping analyses conducted by law enforcement using available 
commercial software could have underlying errors.  It also suggests that inaccurate 
cell site analysis could be contributing to wrongful convictions in many of the tens 
 
137  Minor, supra note 18, at 35.  
138  Kirkham, supra note 19, at 376; see also Alexander Ransom, FBI Historical Cell Site Analysis, Law 
Office of Alexander Ransom, PLLC, (Sept. 8, 2018), http://ransom-lawfirm.com/fbi-historical-
cell-site-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/CTG4-P82H] (discussing State v. Ramirez, 425 P.3d 534 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2018) cert denied, 435 P.3d 266 (Wash. 2019)). 
139  Minor, supra note 18, at 35–36.  
140  Id.  
141  Id. at 35. 
142  Id. at 45–46.  
143  Id. at 47. 
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of thousands of criminal cases where historical CSLI evidence is used each year.  
Denmark’s telecommunications scandal again serves as a cautionary tale of 
using unvalidated methodologies to produce forensic evidence.  It was, in fact, the 
discovery of “multiple glitches” in the software police had used to analyze CSLI data 
that prompted the country’s moratorium on cellphone location evidence, the review 
of thousands of cases, and the discovery of even further flaws in the data and 
methodologies police were using. 144   One source of errors occurred where the 
“conversion algorithm” that was utilized to sync the geographical coordinates of cell 
sites cellular providers used with the ones police used, “was applied twice to some 
mobile tower data, which moved the geolocation positions by a couple of hundred 
meters.”145  The scandal also revealed that: 
The IT system used for converting telecommunications data was developed internally 
by the police and maintained by a single employee.  Before December 2018, there were 
no administrative practices for quality control of the data conversion system, not even 
simple checks to ensure the entire data received from mobile service providers had been 
properly converted.146  
Cellphone forensic experts have said that such errors “are actually quite 
common when automated software is used to analyze cellular call detail records 
without being verified or validated.” 147   Nevertheless, challenges to unvalidated 
mapping software have been rejected by courts.148 
I I I .  C HAL L E NGI NG T HE  ADMI S S I B I L I T Y  OF  HI S T OR I C AL  C S L I  E VI DE NC E  
The limitations of correlating cellphone location with cell-tower location, the 
unknown accuracy of CSLI and CDR data, and the lack of validated and reliable 
methodologies to interpret historical CSLI create a dangerous predicament: 
untested and unvalidated evidence disguised as scientific and reliable evidence can 
make its way to juries in criminal trials.  Until the United States is forced to overhaul 
the way this data is collected and analyzed as prompted by the Danish 
telecommunications scandal, the safeguards against unreliable evidence in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence can provide some bases for exclusion or heightened 
scrutiny.  The following evidentiary issues should be considered when historical 
CSLI evidence is introduced against a criminal defendant. 
 
144  Henley, supra note 4.  
145  IT-Pol, supra note 1. 
146  Id. 
147  Daniel et al., supra note 72. 
148  See e.g., Ransom, supra note 138.  
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A. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 – Testimony by Expert Witnesses 
Testimony that is based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge” falls within the scope of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 149   Courts are divided as to whether evidence about how 
cellphones connect to towers and how historical CSLI is analyzed requires expert 
testimony.150  This means that in some courts, custodians of records for cellular 
companies and law enforcement officers – without training in cellular technology 
or the validity and reliability of CSLI and CDR data and analysis – can provide lay 
testimony about how historical CSLI places a defendant in proximity to a crime 
scene. 151   This can result in misleading information and the introduction of 
apparently objective, technical information that has not been subject to the 
evidentiary standards typically required for expert testimony.  Arguably, the line 
between what is permissible as lay testimony and what requires expert testimony 
should be drawn at “testimony that goes beyond the simple descriptions of cell 
phone basics, specifically testimony that purports to pinpoint the general area in 
which the cell phone user was located based on historical cellular data, requires 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”152  
Rule 702 sets forth the requirements for testimony by expert witnesses.153  The 
subparts of the rule and federal caselaw interpreting these requirements provide 
guiding factors for courts to use in assessing the reliability and admissibility of 
expert testimony.154  Analyzed against these criteria, historical CSLI evidence may 
fail to meet the requirements of Rule 702.155 
Rule 702(a) specifies that a witness who is qualified by “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education” may testify if this expertise “will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”156  Individuals who 
introduce historical CSLI evidence must be able to explain how cellular systems 
 
149  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a); see Kirkham, supra note 19, at 375. 
150  Grimm, supra note 88, at 54 (comparing e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 364-65 
(4th Cir. 2015), with United States v. Natal, 849 F.3d 530, 533 (2d Cir. 2017)).  
151  See e.g., State v. DePaula, 166 A.3d 1085, 1098, (N.H. 2017) (citation omitted) (holding that 
“custodians could testify as lay witnesses because they possessed sufficient personal knowledge 
to discuss generally the means by which cell phones connect to the closest tower and the general 
ranges of cell towers”).   
152  Collins v. State, 172 So.3d 724, 743 (Miss. 2015): see also, Grimm, supra note 88, at 54–55. 
153  Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
154  Id.  
155  See Kirkham, supra note 19, at 375–79.  
156  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).  
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operate, how cellphones connect to cell towers, the reliability of the data collected, 
and how the CSLI and CDR data was reliably analyzed.  Though cellphones are 
ubiquitous and the average layperson may understand the basic way cell towers 
work, there are many aspects of historical CSLI evidence that are beyond the 
average cellphone user’s experience, such as the variability of cell signal, the cellular 
network equipment and technology used to generate CDRs, and the methodology 
employed in analyzing CSLI and CDR data.  Experts who are qualified to testify 
about the relationship between historical CSLI and a cellphone’s approximate 
location may include electrical engineers 157  and law enforcement agents with 
“specialized training” and experience in conducting historical cell site analysis.158  
Attorneys should be prepared to challenge the qualifications of witnesses 
introducing cellphone location evidence, or to call their own experts to accurately 
explain the highly technical and variable aspects of CSLI data and analysis.  
 Rule 702(b) further requires that an expert’s testimony be “based on 
sufficient facts or data.” 159   This suggests that, as a prerequisite to providing 
testimony, the underlying data supporting an expert’s opinion must be reliable.  As 
discussed above, there are no known error rates for the CSLI data contained in 
CDRs or cellular network records used in CSLI analysis. 160   Denmark’s 
telecommunications scandal and the Adnan Syed case suggest that incorrect data 
may form the basis of historical CSLI analysis in some instances.  Unless the data 
contained in a CDR and its accompanying cellular network records have been 
externally validated, any subsequent analysis and testimony is arguably not based 
on “sufficient” data.161    
 Rule 702(c) next requires that the testimony be “the product of reliable 
principles and methods.” 162   In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the 
Supreme Court set forth factors for determining “whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that 
 
157  United States v. Banks, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1251 (D. Kan. 2015) (finding “radio frequency 
engineer[s]” who worked for cellular company were qualified to provide expert testimony about 
defendant’s approximate location based on cell site location data).  
158  United States v. Jones, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting federal agent’s extensive and 
specialized training qualified him to provide expert testimony). 
159  Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). 
160  See infra Part II, A.  
161  See Fed. R. Evid. 702(b); see generally Stonefire Grill, Inc., v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 
1023, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2013).  
162  Fed. R. Evid. 702(c). 
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reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”163  These 
factors include (1) whether the methodology “can be (and has been) tested”; (2) 
whether it “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) what the “known 
or potential rate of error” is; and (4) its “general acceptance” within relevant 
scientific communities.164   
As discussed above165, the principles and methods used to analyze historical 
CSLI have not been tested or validated outside the law enforcement community, 
and there is no known error rate for the underlying data or methodologies used.  At 
least one study166 and the implications of the Danish telecommunications scandal 
suggest that unreliable methodologies for data collection and analysis exist.  
Currently, historical CSLI analysis is not used or accepted outside the law 
enforcement community, but using tower-location to determine physical location 
has been acknowledged as problematic by the FCC in its administration of the 911 
system.167  The “widespread acceptance” of historical CSLI by the law enforcement 
community – the very community offering this evidence – should not be mistaken 
for the reliability associated with acceptance by a “relevant scientific community.”168  
Although no factor identified in Daubert is dispositive 169 , the current state of 
historical CSLI and analysis falls short in each category.170  Until experts test these 
methodologies, subject them to further peer review and “the scrutiny of the 
scientific community,” and determine the potential error rates of data collection 
and analysis 171 , testimony based on CSLI mapping techniques and software is 
arguably not the product of “reliable” methods.  
 Finally, Rule 702(d) requires that the expert “has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”172  Assuming a properly qualified 
expert under 702(a) has externally validated the data in a CDR report to meet the 
requirements of 702(b), and then employed a reliable methodology to analyze the 
CSLI data to meet the requirements of 702(c), an issue under 702(d) may potentially 
 
163  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).  
164  Id. at 593–94. 
165  See infra Part II, A and C.  
166  See Minor, supra note 18. 
167  Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls, supra note 124. 
168  Daubert, 509 U.S at 594 (citation omitted).  
169  See id. at 593, 594. 
170  See Kirkham, supra note 19, at 375–79. 
171  Daubert, 509 U.S at 593. 
172  Fed. R. Evid. 702(d). 
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still arise.  However, given the current problems with unvalidated CSLI data and 
methodologies, proposed cellphone location evidence may not survive challenges 
under 702(a)-(c) to warrant further scrutiny under 702(d). 
B. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(6) – Hearsay and the Exception for 
Business Records 
Out of court statements, including printed statements and records, are 
generally inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as “hearsay.”173  
However, CDRs offered as business records are frequently admitted by courts as 
an exception to the prohibition against hearsay under Rule 803(6) when “the 
underlying data is kept and maintained by a reliable computer program in the 
regular course of business.”174  CDRs are essentially computer records175 produced 
by cellphone companies for tracking “customer billing, carrier rates, for network 
monitoring, and for facility capacity planning.”176  To qualify as a business record 
under 803(6), the following conditions must be met:   
(a) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by - 
someone with knowledge; 
(b) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, 
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(c) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(d) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified 
witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11)or (12) or with a statute 
permitting certification; and 
(e) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.177 
 
173  Fed. R. Evid. 802. 
174  People v. Zavala, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
175  That CDRs are automatically generated by cellular network system computers does not 
affect their admissibility under the business records exception.  See 1 Jack B. Weinstein & 
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence Manual § 16.07[2][g] (2020) (citing United 
States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 451-453 (6th Cir. 2001) (“trial court did not err in finding 
computer printout trustworthy when employee of company testified it represented type of 
record his company regularly generated and maintained in its files, and that his company relied 
on similar reports for billing purposes; fact that many entries were made by computer, rather 
than by human being, and witness’s lack of knowledge of error rate did not disqualify record for 
admission as business record.”). 
176  Leahy, supra note 48, § 1. 
177  Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).  
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The rationale for the business records exception is based on “reliability and 
need.”178  Because records produced by businesses are regularly checked, 
consistently produced, relied upon by businesses, and compiled by employees 
whose employment incentivizes their attention to accuracy, these records are 
viewed as sufficiently trustworthy to overcome the rule against hearsay.179   
Defendants have tried (unsuccessfully) to challenge the admissibility of CDRs 
under the business records exception from several angles: objecting to the use of 
reports that are not generated during the course of business but in response to a 
request from law enforcement180; objecting to a lack of foundation showing how the 
records were produced, identified, and stored181; and challenging the reliability or 
trustworthiness of the record. 182   Although there is no known error rate or 
validation methodology for CSLI data collected by cellular companies or produced 
in CDRs, courts have generally treated these records as sufficiently trustworthy.183  
However, what is reliable for the business purposes of cellular carriers is not 
necessarily reliable for the purpose of proving a defendant’s location in criminal 
proceedings. 
 The fact that CDRs do not constitute hearsay under the business records 
exception does not address their admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert.184  “The 
former question goes to reliability of the statements contained therein; the latter 
question goes to the scientific reliability of the methodology that forms that basis of 
the statements.”185  When offered as evidence for the limited purpose of a cellphone 
user’s calls or cellular activity, CDRs may be sufficiently reliable to be admissible 
 
178  1 Weinstein, supra note 175, at § 16.07[2][b]. 
179  Id. 
180  See, e.g., People v. Zavala, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 844–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A Sprint records 
custodian] also described how he obtains those records in response to legal demands . . . Courts 
in other jurisdictions have considered this issue, and the majority of them conclude a printed 
compilation of data produced by human query for use at trial falls under the business records 
exception provided the underlying data is kept by a reliable computer software program in the 
regular course of business.”). 
181  See, e.g., People v. Bahena, No. 213118, 2020 WL 133378, at *4 (Ca. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2020) 
(citation omitted). 
182  State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). 
183  Id. at *8 (“Several courts have approved the use of cell phone and cell tower usage records in 
criminal cases as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s approximate location . . . [o]ur view 
is no different.”) (internal citations omitted); Minor, supra note 18, at 35.  
184  See State v. Kirsch, 820 A.2d 236, 245 (Conn. 2003).  
185  Id.  
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under the business records exception. 186   But when offered as evidence of a 
defendant’s location, CDRs are arguably still not admissible for the reasons 
discussed above. 
Whenever the business records exception is cited for historical CSLI evidence, 
attorneys should be prepared to challenge the scientific reliability under Rule 702 
and Daubert, as well as the adequacy of the foundation and authentication of the 
evidence.  If admitted under the business records exception, attorneys should 
consider requesting a limited jury instruction that explains that the data is 
admissible only for the limited purpose of suggesting that a phone connected to a 
cell tower at a specific time.187  This may then protect against jurors considering 
what is only sufficiently reliable to meet the business records exception as 
scientifically reliable evidence of a defendant’s physical location. 
C. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 901 – Requirement of Authentication  
The introduction of historical CSLI evidence also poses an issue for the 
evidentiary requirement of authentication.188  Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 
901(b) requires the proponent of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”189  The rule goes 
on to list examples of evidence satisfying the requirement, which includes in 
subsection (9) “[e]vidence describing a process or system and showing that it 
produces an accurate result.”190  The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule state 
that “Example (9) is designed for situations in which the accuracy of a result is 
dependent upon a process or system which produces it.”191  The accuracy of CDRs 
and historical CSLI evidence clearly depends on the method of analysis used to 
produce them.  Thus, attorneys should be prepared to raise authentication 
challenges to CDRs that are not supported by evidence showing the carrier’s 
system produced accurate historical CSLI data and (unlike the Syed case) that the 
information in the CDR “is what the proponent claims it is.”192 
 
186  See Blank, supra note 37, at 51–54. 
187  See Kirkham, supra note 19 at 390. 
188  See Blank, supra note 37, at 53-54. 
189  Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).  
190  Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9). 
191  Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule. 
192  Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). 
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D. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403 – Excluding Relevant Evidence for 
Prejudice or Confusion 
Since the early 2000s, the “CSI effect” has been described as a phenomenon 
influencing jury deliberations in criminal cases.193  In response to the popularity of 
true crime and forensic television shows, the CSI effect is believed to “lead[] jurors 
to have unrealistic expectations of forensic tests and possibly cause them to 
incorrectly weigh the importance of either the absence or presence of forensic 
evidence.”194  Though the effect is often cited by prosecutors who believe it creates a 
higher standard for the evidence they must demonstrate to yield a conviction, it is 
also believed to cause juries to be “more likely to convict based on a 
misinterpretation of forensic evidence.”195 
Authorities in Denmark cited the potential for jurors to overvalue forensic 
cellphone evidence when discovering the data and software flaws undermining the 
accuracy of cellphone location evidence. 196   Prior to the telecommunications 
scandal, cellphone location evidence was widely viewed as “highly accurate” and 
given “high significance and value in courtrooms because [it was] considered 
almost objective.”197  The likely prejudice and confusion that unvalidated cellphone 
location evidence could create caused the country to take significant steps to control 
the use of this evidence.198  There is also a risk that American juries may overly weigh 
cellphone location evidence as objective and highly accurate forensic evidence in 
criminal cases, despite the true accuracy of historical CSLI evidence being unknown 
and often overstated,199 and this “objective” evidence being “in fact produced by the 
prosecution”200 offering it. 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is designed to serve as a gatekeeper to 
otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] 
 
193  John Alldredge, The “CSI Effect” and Its Potential Impact on Juror Decisions, 3 Themis: Res. J. of 
Just. Stud. & Forensic Sci. 114, 115 (2015). 
194  Id.  
195  Id.  
196  Henley, supra note 4.  
197  Id.  
198  Id.  
199  Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231. 
200  Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me with Science: Wrongful Convictions and the “Reverse 
CSI-Effect”, 17 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 481, 483 (2011). 
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misleading the jury… .”201  The accuracy of cellphone location evidence is confusing 
and not fully understood, and the precision of tower-location data is misleading.202 
Despite this, juries who are presented with “forensic” cellphone evidence by 
“experts” are likely to view this evidence as highly accurate and objective.203  Thus, 
attorneys should be prepared to challenge the admissibility of cellphone location 
evidence under 403.  Defendants who challenge the admissibility of cellphone 
location evidence under 403 should cite to the phenomenon of jurors overvaluing 
forensic evidence when arguing that any probative value in determining a 
defendant’s general location from historical CSLI is outweighed by the prejudice 
that would result from jurors failing to appreciate the lack of validation and 
unknown reliability of this evidence, as well as the confusing misconception that 
cellphone signals connect to the closest cell tower.204  A defendant’s 403 argument 
should also cite the risks inherent to expert testimony which “can be powerful, 
misleading, and difficult to evaluate” and thus deserves greater weight when 
assessing potential prejudice under 403.205  At the very least, attorneys confronting 
cellphone location evidence should proceed with caution as criminal attorneys in 
Denmark have been forced to do: “We are probably going to question it as we 
normally question a witness or other types of evidence, where we consider 
circumstances like who produced the evidence, and why and how.”206 
I V.  C ONC L US I ON 
Cellphone location evidence has been offered as accurate by law enforcement 
and accepted as accurate by courts without any validation or proven reliability.  
There are several misconceptions about how cellphone technology works and how 
much information can truly be gleaned from historical CSLI data.  The limited 
review of the methodologies used to collect and analyze cellphone location data and 
the 2019 telecommunications scandal in Denmark suggest that the ways law 
enforcement and prosecutors use CSLI data does not always produce accurate 
evidence of a defendant’s location.  And still, cellphone location evidence is used in 
 
201  Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
202  See infra Part II. 
203  See Henley, supra note 4. 
204  But see United States v. Morgan, 292 F. Supp. 3d 475,  485, 486 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting 403 
challenge where defendant argued that the imprecision of cellphone location evidence and likely 
misconception that phones connect with the closest tower were misleading when testimony could 
be limited to a possible location within a general coverage area).  
205  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted). 
206  Henley, supra note 4.  
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tens of thousands of criminal trials each year.207  
 Although this evidence is widely permitted in criminal trials, the gaping 
holes in the sufficiency of the underlying data and reliability of the methodologies 
used to analyze historical CSLI create opportunities for evidentiary challenges to 
the admissibility of cellphone location evidence.  Until the United States is forced to 
reckon with the limitations and risks of this data as prompted by the Danish 
scandal, challenges under Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 702, 901, and 403 should 
be raised to keep what is possibly junk science, and more likely junk evidence, from 
being introduced against defendants in criminal trials.  
  
 
207  Cahn, supra note 10.  
